“Frothy.” That was the Prime Minister’s word for it. Speaking on RNZ’s Morning Report, Christopher Luxon told New Zealanders that reporting about a critical minerals deal with the United States was “speculative and hypothetical” and “a bit ahead of itself.”
By Tuesday afternoon, both governments had issued a joint statement committing to “explore further opportunities to expand co-operation on critical minerals.” Two days later, New Zealand was sitting at a table in Washington with 54 countries, hosted by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as the Americans signed eleven new bilateral frameworks in a single day and launched a whole new global alliance called FORGE.
Either Luxon was genuinely out of the loop on what his own government was doing, or he wasn’t being straight with us. Neither option is particularly reassuring.
To understand what might be heading our way, look across the Tasman. Australia secretly negotiated a critical minerals framework with the US over five months last year, only revealing it once it was signed. As Jane Kelsey, a University of Auckland law professor, has detailed, the deal included price-support mechanisms, curbs on Chinese investment, a US$8.5 billion financing pipeline with joint ownership of projects, and commitments to major new military purchases. Australia’s mining industry celebrated it as “AUKUS in action.”
The text says it’s “non-binding and unenforceable.” Don’t let that fool you. Trump’s January proclamation makes clear that countries falling short of US demands face retaliatory trade sanctions. Non-binding, perhaps. Consequence-free, definitely not.
This is the template New Zealand officials are working from. Both MFAT and MBIE have confirmed they’re involved in discussions on a “non-binding critical minerals framework” with the US, with MBIE’s general manager of resource markets, Katherine MacNeill, stating her officials were working to “support discussions with the United States.” Deputy PM David Seymour, as quoted in a NZ Herald article, revealed that a framework summary had already been discussed at Cabinet. Yet Luxon won’t commit to public consultation — even after being asked three times over three days, he dodged each time.
This isn’t just about rocks in the ground. It’s about a US-led geopolitical strategy to break China’s dominance over critical mineral supply chains. According to the US State Department, China controls around 60 per cent of the world’s rare earth minerals and processes roughly 90 per cent of the global supply. These minerals are essential for everything from smartphones to fighter jets, AI chips to electric vehicles.
Trump’s January proclamation set a 180-day deadline for “trading partners” to sign agreements or face tariffs. New Zealand, having joined the Minerals Security Partnership in November 2025, has effectively designated itself as exactly such a partner.
The government’s own Minerals Strategy, published in January 2025, lists 37 “critical minerals” —21 of which are exploitable in New Zealand—with a goal of doubling mineral exports to $3 billion by 2035. Resources Minister Shane Jones has been championing this with characteristic gusto.
So when Luxon says this is preliminary and New Zealand is just one of “40-plus countries” in early conversations, the timeline says otherwise. The mapping was done in 2024. The strategy was published in 2025. The partnership joined in November. Framework discussions under way for weeks. A summary is already at the Cabinet.
Into this murky picture, add the Waitangi Tribunal. The Tribunal’s climate change inquiry (WAI 3325) filed an urgent memorandum arguing that a secret deal with the US would show “wilful disregard” by the Crown for its Treaty obligations. They flagged the risk that negotiations could be “finalised and signed without Māori, or anyone else in Aotearoa, being made aware.”
Ironically, the government’s own Minerals Strategy was released with a commitment to honour Te Tiriti obligations. Hard to do that when you’re conducting negotiations behind closed doors.
Whether you’re sympathetic to Treaty claims or not, the principle matters. Decisions about who mines our land, under what conditions, and for whose benefit should not be driven by another country’s military agenda in secret negotiations.
Then there’s the dragon in the room. When asked by the NZ Herald for its view, the Chinese Embassy in New Zealand said it had “noted the relevant reports and is currently gathering further information.” That’s diplomatic language for “we’re watching very carefully.”
China is New Zealand’s largest trading partner. Any deal requiring us to screen or restrict Chinese investment in our mining sector — as the Australian template does — carries obvious trade risks. New Zealand has long prided itself on an independent foreign policy. Signing up to what is explicitly a US strategic play against China raises serious questions about what we’re giving away and what we’re getting back.
Run any business for long enough, and you learn that the deals done in back rooms usually benefit the people in the room, not the people outside it. That’s not cynicism — it’s experience.
New Zealand’s development of its mineral sector could genuinely benefit this country. Critical minerals are, as the name suggests, critical. There’s nothing inherently wrong with wanting a seat at that table.
But there’s everything wrong with how this is being handled. Secret negotiations. A PM who dismisses legitimate reporting as “frothy” while his officials are deep in discussions. No commitment to public consultation. Treaty obligations are treated as an afterthought. And a framework shaped not by our interests, but by the strategic demands of a US administration that has made clear: sign up or face tariffs.
New Zealanders deserve to know the full scope of what’s being discussed, what we’re being asked to commit to, and the potential consequences for our trading relationships, our environment, and our sovereignty. Before the deal is done, not after.
Once you’ve handed over the keys, good luck asking for them back.
Steve Baron is a New Zealand-based political commentator and author. He holds a BA with a double major in Economics and Political Science from the University of Waikato and an Honours Degree in Political Science from Victoria University of Wellington. A former businessman in the advertising industry, he founded the political lobby group Better Democracy NZ. https://stevebaron.co.nz
Josh says:
Hang on, so Luxon called the reporting “frothy” and then literally two days later we’re sitting at a table in Washington signing up to this stuff? That’s pretty concerning tbh. I’m trying to wrap my head around this – if these deals are supposedly “non-binding” but come with the threat of trade sanctions if we don’t comply, doesn’t that basically make them binding in practice? My generation is going to inherit whatever sovereignty trade-offs get made here, so shouldn’t we at least get proper transparency about what’s actually on the table before any commitments are made?
Linda J says:
From my time on council, I’ve seen how easily central government can steamroll local decision-making processes when they want something done quickly. Steve raises valid concerns about transparency here – if Luxon genuinely didn’t know what his own ministries were negotiating, that suggests serious coordination failures at the executive level. The “non-binding” language is particularly troubling because I’ve seen how these framework agreements create momentum that becomes very difficult to reverse once signed. What worries me most is the lack of proper select committee scrutiny before we even got to the exploratory stage. Both National and Labour governments have been guilty of this kind of fait accompli diplomacy, but when you’re potentially reshaping our trade relationships and resource sovereignty, surely Parliament deserves more than a retrospective briefing? The Australian precedent should be a wake-up call about conducting these negotiations with proper democratic oversight from the outset.
Sarah says:
This whole situation feels like a masterclass in how not to communicate with your own citizens. As someone in my generation, we’ve grown up expecting more transparency from our leaders. The fact that Luxon seemed genuinely blindsided by his own government’s negotiations is pretty concerning. The Australian example is particularly telling here – secret negotiations followed by a massive commitment that essentially locks them into the US orbit economically and militarily. I’m curious though Steve, do we know what specific minerals NZ would be expected to prioritise under this framework? And given our much smaller mining sector compared to Australia, are we potentially signing up for obligations we can’t actually deliver on without major environmental and regulatory changes?
Don says:
Right, so we’re supposed to just hand over our mineral rights to the Americans because they’re worried about the Chinese? Sounds like we’re being asked to choose which foreign power gets to call the shots on our resources. Out here in the Wairarapa we know that when someone says a deal is “non-binding” but comes with trade sanctions if you don’t play ball, that’s like saying the dog collar is optional but the chain isn’t. Wellington needs to remember that this country’s wealth comes from what we can dig up and grow, not from playing lapdog to superpowers who’ll drop us the moment it suits them.
Greenie says:
Steve raises crucial questions about transparency, but I’m particularly concerned about the environmental implications being glossed over in these discussions. Critical minerals extraction – whether it’s lithium, rare earths, or cobalt – carries massive ecological risks that we’ve seen play out badly in places like West Papua and the DRC. Here in Nelson, we work with councils who are already grappling with legacy mining issues, and the idea of fast-tracking new projects under US pressure is deeply worrying. If we’re going to pursue this path, we need iron-clad environmental safeguards and genuine community consultation – not backroom deals that prioritise geopolitics over our clean, green reputation. The climate transition needs these minerals, but not at any cost.
Murray says:
In my experience teaching about New Zealand’s foreign policy over the decades, I’ve seen this pattern before – governments presenting fait accompli arrangements as mere “explorations” of cooperation. My students used to ask why smaller nations like ours seemed to repeatedly find ourselves locked into frameworks we had little hand in designing, and I fear this critical minerals deal exemplifies precisely that dynamic. The comparison with Australia’s experience is particularly illuminating, Steve – the secrecy, the euphemistic language about “non-binding” agreements that clearly carry significant consequences, and the apparent disconnect between what ministers tell the public and what officials are actually negotiating behind closed doors. What concerns me most is not necessarily the substance of closer cooperation with the US on minerals (there are valid strategic arguments on both sides), but rather the lack of genuine parliamentary and public debate before we commit to frameworks that could fundamentally reshape our economic sovereignty. This feels like 1984’s ANZUS moment all over again – major strategic decisions being made without the robust civic discourse that democracy demands.
Trev says:
Typical bloody politicians – either Luxon didn’t know what his own team was up to or he was feeding us a line. Either way, not a good look mate. As a small business owner I’m all for trade deals that actually help us, but this sounds like we’re getting railroaded into something that benefits the Yanks more than us. If Australia’s deal is anything to go by, we’ll end up locked into their military spending and shut out of Chinese investment whether we like it or not. Would be nice if they consulted the people actually trying to run businesses before signing us up for this stuff.
Graham Scott says:
The timing does look off. Calling reporting “frothy” then signing two days later raises a fair question about what changed, or what was already locked in before the public statements.
On the binding vs non-binding thing, you’re touching on something real. Even if there’s no formal enforcement mechanism written down, the trade leverage is always there underneath. Other countries will notice if we ignore it, and that creates its own pressure. Worth watching how this plays out with actual compliance down the line, because that’s when you see whether something
dean_builds says:
The non-binding stuff with trade sanction teeth is basically a handshake deal that’ll hurt us if we don’t play along, reckon that’s the real issue here. Transparency before signing feels like the bare minimum for something this big.