Steve Baron: Four Years Without Safeguards: Why New Zealand’s Parliamentary Term Proposal Needs Real Scrutiny

Steve Baron: Four Years Without Safeguards

The government has quietly allocated $25 million for a referendum on four-year parliamentary terms, potentially to coincide with the 2026 election. You might think this sounds reasonable. After all, three years seems rather short to get anything meaningful done, doesn’t it? But here’s the thing: we’re about to hand over more power to our politicians for longer, and we’re doing it without asking the most important question – what safeguards are we putting in place?

There’s an old principle that applies whenever anyone seeks more authority: you don’t just ask “How much more?” You ask, “What stops you from misusing it?” Right now, we’re being offered a longer parliamentary term without anyone seriously addressing that second question.

The Missing Safeguards

University of Otago law professor Andrew Geddis has hit the nail on the head. He warns that moving to a four-year term with no other changes would give the executive branch “a huge amount of control over not just how government works but also how Parliament operates, and we will allow them to have that for longer.” That should make every New Zealander pause and think.

Here’s what most Kiwis don’t realise: our three-year term isn’t just unusual internationally – it’s one of the few things protecting us from executive overreach. Yes, three years is short. But so is the list of constitutional checks and balances we have against government power. Countries with four or five-year terms typically have upper houses, strong committee systems, codified constitutions with entrenched provisions, or other mechanisms to constrain executive authority. We have virtually none of these.

Think about it this way. If you owned a business and someone proposed giving the CEO significantly more authority and a longer contract, you’d want robust oversight mechanisms in place first, wouldn’t you? You’d want an independent board, clear performance metrics, and the ability to intervene if things went sideways. Yet we’re proposing to do exactly the opposite with our democracy – extend the term first, worry about safeguards later. Or perhaps never.

The last time we had a referendum on parliamentary terms was in 1990, when 69 per cent of voters rejected extending the term – and this wasn’t just a vocal minority, as 82 per cent of eligible voters turned out. That was before MMP, and the public clearly didn’t trust politicians with more time under our old first-past-the-post system. But has MMP really changed the equation as much as politicians claim or as much as you and I might have hoped? Or have we simply created a new form of executive dominance, where coalition agreements and party discipline give Prime Ministers and their cabinets even more control than before?

ACT’s Stripped-Back Proposal

ACT’s original proposal had at least attempted to address this power imbalance. David Seymour proposed that governments could only access a four-year term if they agreed to give up control of select committees to the opposition. Under his scheme, select committee membership would be based on non-executive MPs only – meaning ministers wouldn’t count when calculating the proportions, automatically giving opposition parties the majority. The catch? This would be voluntary. Governments wanting to stick with three-year terms could keep control of their committees. Those wanting four years would have to hand over scrutiny powers to opposition MPs. It was a trade-off: more time in office, but more accountability through genuine opposition oversight.

But here’s what’s happened: the Justice Committee has recommended stripping out ACT’s select committee conditions entirely. They want a straightforward referendum on four-year terms with no accountability safeguards attached. No opposition control of committees. No trade-offs. Just more time for governments to exercise power. And even if ACT’s original proposal had survived, would it really have been enough? Shifting who sits on select committees doesn’t fundamentally alter the power dynamic when the executive still controls the legislative agenda, sets the terms of debate, and can ram through legislation under urgency.

Speaking of urgency, this is where Sir Geoffrey Palmer’s latest warnings become particularly relevant. In his new book, How to Save Democracy in Aotearoa New Zealand, published last month, Palmer argues that we should drastically limit the government’s ability to bypass proper democratic processes. He suggests requiring a 75 per cent majority in Parliament for urgency to be taken when passing legislation. Think about that. Our former Prime Minister – a man who actually ran the system and understands its flaws intimately – is saying that giving governments more time without fixing the urgency problem would be dangerous.

Palmer’s concern isn’t theoretical. This current government passed fourteen bills under urgency without select committee scrutiny in just seven weeks earlier this year. Imagine what they could do with an extra year in their term and no additional constraints. Palmer describes New Zealand as an “executive paradise” – a system where the cabinet can essentially do whatever it wants, whenever it wants, for as long as it wants. Extending the parliamentary term without addressing urgency is like giving that paradise an upgrade to first class.

Learning from the Swiss

The Swiss Alternative

What we actually need is a proper conversation about the Swiss model of direct democracy. Switzerland has four-year terms, but – and this is crucial – they also have the Veto Referendum (Facultative or Optional Referendum). Citizens can challenge any law passed by parliament if they gather 50,000 signatures within 100 days. This isn’t some radical fantasy; it’s a proven system that’s worked for over a century in one of the world’s most stable democracies.

I’d support five-year terms tomorrow if we adopted the Swiss Veto Referendum. Why? Because it fundamentally changes the power relationship between citizens and politicians. Instead of voting every few years and hoping for the best, citizens retain genuine oversight over the legislative process. Politicians can’t simply rely on their majority to push through unpopular laws and then wait out the election cycle. They must govern with the consent of the people, as demonstrated through actual democratic mechanisms rather than opinion polls.

But here’s what we’re getting instead: a simple referendum asking whether we want four-year terms, with no discussion of constitutional safeguards, no exploration of direct democracy mechanisms, and no honest conversation about what we’re giving up. It’s like being asked whether you want a bigger house without being told you’ll lose the locks on your doors.

The broad political support for this change should be a warning sign in itself. When was the last time politicians from across the spectrum agreed on something that genuinely constrained their own power? They’re united on this because it benefits them, not necessarily because it benefits us. That’s not cynicism – it’s basic political economy. People respond to incentives, and the incentive here is more time in power with less accountability.

I’m not arguing that three-year terms are perfect. They’re not. The constant election cycle can discourage long-term thinking and make it difficult to implement complex reforms. But the solution isn’t simply to extend the terms and hope for the best. The solution is to couple any extension with genuine democratic safeguards that restore and enhance citizen oversight.

The Real Choice

Before we vote in 2026, New Zealanders need to demand answers to these questions: What specific checks and balances will be implemented alongside any term extension? Why are we rushing this constitutional change with minimal public debate? And most importantly, why aren’t we looking at proven models like the Swiss Veto Referendum that could actually enhance, rather than diminish, democratic accountability?

We have one year to get this conversation right. Let’s not waste it by accepting a deal that gives politicians more power for longer without giving citizens the tools to hold them accountable. And let’s not waste $25 million on a referendum that asks the wrong question. Our democracy deserves better than a referendum that asks us to trust politicians with more time but doesn’t trust us with more power.

The choice shouldn’t be between three years and four years. The choice should be between the status quo and a genuinely enhanced democratic system that couples longer terms with stronger citizen oversight. Anything less is just asking us to hand over the keys to our democracy and hope the politicians drive responsibly.

Based on what we’ve seen with urgency provisions and executive overreach, I suspect they won’t drive responsibly. And that’s exactly why this matters.


Steve Baron

Steve Baron is a New Zealand-based political commentator and author. He holds a BA with a double major in Economics and Political Science from the University of Waikato and an Honours Degree in Political Science from Victoria University of Wellington. A former businessman in the advertising industry, he founded the political lobby group Better Democracy NZ. https://stevebaron.co.nz

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  1. blank

    Why can’t these politicians see that we are never going to give them a longer term in power without protection and without more safeguards? They are just going to waste $ and dissapoint everyone. Most of us agree with a longer term (I think) but we are never going to vote for it.

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